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Abstract 
Information
.
and Communications Technologies 
globally are moving towards Service Oriented 
Architectures and Web Services.  The healthcare 
environment is rapidly moving to the use of Service 
Oriented Architecture/Web Services systems 
interconnected via this global open Internet. Such 
moves present major challenges where these 
structures are not based on highly trusted operating 
systems. This paper argues the need of a radical 
re-think of access control in the contemporary 
healthcare environment in light of modern 
information system structures, legislative and 
regulatory requirements, and security operation 
demands in Health Information Systems. This paper 
proposes the Open and Trusted Health Information 
Systems (OTHIS), a viable solution including 
override capability to the provision of appropriate 
levels of secure access control for the protection of 
sensitive health data. 
Keywords: access control, architecture of health 
information systems, security for health information 
systems, health informatics, information assurance, 
trusted system, open solutions. 
1 Introduction 
Social, political and legal imperatives are emerging 
worldwide for the enhancement of the privacy and 
security of health information systems (HIS). A high 
level of “information assurance” is now seen as the 
necessary baseline for the establishment and 
maintenance of both future and current HIS. A 
security violation in HIS, such as an unauthorised 
disclosure or unauthorised alteration of individual 
health information, has the potential for disaster 
among healthcare providers and consumers.  
Indeed, such emerging legal obligations as 
“breach notification”, whereby custodians of private 
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data are legally compelled to divulge any real or 
suspected breach in privacy to possible victims, are 
gaining international attention. This has been 
recently referenced by the USA legal firm, Steptoe & 
Johnson LLP (Steptoe & Johnson LLP 2008) , in the 
following terms:  
New data protection requirements are being 
considered all over, including in Australia, 
Mexico, Turkey, South Korea, Peru, and Vietnam. 
Although the concept of Electronic Health Records 
has much potential for improving the processing of 
health data, electronic health records may also pose 
new threats for compromising sensitive personal 
health data if not designed and managed effectively. 
Indeed malevolent motivations could feasibly 
disclose confidential personal health information on 
a more massive scale and at a higher speed than 
possible with traditional paper-based medical 
records. There is also the factor of the healthcare 
service providers’ willingness to accept and adopt a 
new technology that does not always facilitate 
efficient working practices. To encourage healthcare 
service consumers and providers to use electronic 
health records, it is crucial to instil confidence that 
the electronic health information is well protected 
and that consumers' privacy is assured.     Indeed, 
unlike other industries and enterprises such as the 
banking and finance sectors, loss and disclosure of 
health record data is normally not recoverable.  
Again unlike the banking sector, a new “account” 
cannot be created along with all other necessary 
identification and authentication data and processes.  
Health data is usually “locked” to an individual. 
However, it can be argued that concepts of 
privacy, with resulting requirements placed on data 
holders to maintain associated confidentiality, have 
rapidly changed in part due to the widespread 
acceptance of Internet based “social networking” and 
the very low cost of Terabyte level data storage 
facilities. Indeed Dyson (2008) has proposed that, in 
an era of “Facebook”, “Flickr” and associated 
systems and services for “free” data sharing, the 
concept of individual privacy may be rapidly 
changing. This change involves a move from closely 
guarding the confidentiality of personal data records 
to one of personal control over access to that data. 
Dyson states that “…people are learning to exert 
some control over which of their data others can 
see...”.  Dyson continues to point out that such 
control over access must become more dynamic and 
even allow for certain levels of ambiguity in just how 
such access patterns may be defined and managed by 
individuals, particularly as this relates to health 
records. Moreover, such access control structures 
have to be “user friendly”, allowing those non-expert 
in aspects of information and data communications 
technology to understand and administer associated 
computer based systems. 
1.1 Security Requirements for E-health 
Achieving the usual security goals, normally applied 
through confidentiality, integrity and availability 
constraints, for HIS is an essential requirement and 
not just a technology feature. Privacy concerns take 
on new importance in this environment and may, in 
some cases, modify aspects of the usual 
confidentiality-integrity-availability trilogy. At the 
same time, emergency override requirements may 
involve more complex definition and implementation 
of confidentiality schemes. This can involve further 
parameters of time and location, identity and 
authentication when accessing healthcare, law 
enforcement or allied professionals, etc.  Security 
techniques are a critical factor in the successful 
implementation of e-health initiatives. Several 
countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom 
(UK) and the United States of America (USA) are 
actively involved in the development of national 
e-health initiatives. These designs rely upon a basic 
set of security requirements to implement their 
e-health initiatives.  
The USA government intends to reform its 
national healthcare system with the goal of 
improving the effectiveness and efficiency of 
healthcare operations whilst assuring that sensitive 
health information remains private and secure 
through their 1996 Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA). The purpose of 
HIPAA provisions is to encourage electronic 
transactions whilst simultaneously requiring 
appropriate security measures for protection of the 
individually identifiable health information. 
Australia’s National E-health Transition 
Authority
1
 (NEHTA) clearly defines similar security 
goals in its mission statements. They emphasise the 
importance of creating a complete, usable and 
implementable security architecture for HIS.  
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NEHTA also recognises that privacy perceptions of 
the Australian community play a major role in 
ensuring the success of e-health systems. 
In the case of the UK, the National Health Service 
(NHS) also clearly affirms the principles of 
information security
2
 to require that all reasonable 
safeguards are in place to prevent inappropriate 
access, unauthorised modification or manipulation of 
sensitive patient record information. 
Section 2 discusses the related work undertaken 
by the Australian national e-health body, National 
E-health Transition Authority (NEHTA). The Open 
and Trusted Health Information Systems (OTHIS) 
structure is our approach to providing a viable 
e-health system with the potential for implementing 
sustainable security measures. OTHIS, outlined in 
Section 3, has the capacity to protect the privacy and 
security of health information under an overall 
trusted health informatics scheme.  This paper 
focuses on one of the OTHIS modules, Health 
Informatics Access Control (HIAC), in Section 4. An 
analysis of HIAC is presented in Section 5. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn and future directions for 
OTHIS are discussed in Section 6. 
2 Related Work 
An analysis of common existing approaches to 
secure health information systems in Australia, UK 
and the USA is given by Liu, Caelli, May and Croll 
(2007). In this paper which addresses sustainability 
of HIS systems, three scenarios related to 
information privacy violations and weaknesses are 
identified and discussed. As we are concerned with 
e-health infrastructures that satisfy the Australian 
environment, Section 2.1 discusses the Australian 
direction on this given by NEHTA. Section 2.2 
discusses the NEHTA approach from the authors’ 
perspectives. 
2.1 National E-health Transition Authority 
NEHTA recommends using a Service Oriented 
Architecture approach to the design of healthcare 
application systems.  “Web Services” technology 
standards provide the capacity for implementing 
secure messaging systems (NEHTA 2005). NEHTA 
argues that the continued development of 
information systems around Web Services 
technology is leading the way for the information and 
communications technology industry into its 
realisation of this Service Oriented Architecture 
approach. Web Services are also accepted as best 
practice for the design of scalable distributed systems 
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today.  The Service Oriented Architecture approach 
is claimed to lead to more reusable, adaptable and 
extensible systems over other techniques.  In 
particular, NEHTA supports the concept that Web 
Services technology has gained notable attention 
within the information and communications 
technology industry. Its use is extending in both 
popularity and market penetration. 
NEHTA work programs for an e-health 
interoperability framework include Clinical 
Information, Medicine Product Directory, Supply 
Chain Efficiency, e-Health Policy, Clinical 
Terminologies, Individual Healthcare Identifiers, 
Healthcare Provider Identifiers, Secure Messaging, 
User Authentication and Shared Electronic Health 
Record Specifications.  
2.2 Discussion on NEHTA Approach 
NEHTA focuses on exchanging clinical information 
by electronic means securely and reliably.  This may 
be achievable at the data communications link level 
by using secure messaging technology.  The fact is 
however that the associated and critical health 
information computer systems will be openly 
connected to the Internet, and thus be exposed to 
“cyber-attacks”.  This exposure has not been 
prevalent before. In this Internet connectivity 
environment, the issues of data “at rest” and “under 
processing” within a specific operating system are far 
more critical, as is evidenced by any cursory 
examination of illicit penetration of computer 
systems connected to the Internet globally.  A 
complete architecture is needed, therefore, and not 
one that involves just a secure messaging system 
alone.  OTHIS addresses the privacy protection and 
security for health systems in a holistic and 
“end-to-end” manner. The OTHIS architecture is 
designed to complement existing work already 
evident in related HIS security areas. 
3 Our Approach – Open and Trusted 
Health Information Systems (OTHIS) 
Security may be implemented at the level of the 
health services applications system. Even if security 
is established within that health service system, 
however, the overall system can be no more secure 
than the operating system upon which the 
applications depend. The operating system itself can 
be no more secure than the hardware facilities of the 
computer on which the operating system performs. 
Likewise, any other software component set at the 
higher levels is totally dependent upon the security 
functions provided at the lower levels. Examples of 
such software include “middleware”, database 
management systems, the network interface 
structure, and the “stack”. The lowest level software 
is the operating system which provides the 
foundational security for the higher levels. The 
operating system also needs a degree of “robustness” 
against possible attacks at its level. 
Necessary healthcare security services such as 
authentication, authorisation, data privacy and data 
integrity can only be confidently assured when the 
operating system is trusted. Thus “trusted operating 
systems” provide the foundation for any security and 
privacy schemes. Such strong security platforms may 
be considered as necessary to ensure the protection of 
electronic health information from both internal and 
external threats as well as providing conformance of 
health information systems to regulatory and legal 
requirements Loscocco, Smalley, Muckelbauer, 
Taylor, Turner and Farrell (1998)  have stated that the 
underlying operating system should be responsible 
for protecting the “application-space” against 
tampering, bypassing and spoofing attacks. They 
address the significance of secure operating systems 
as follows: 
“The threats posed by the modern computing 
environment cannot be addressed without support 
from secure operating systems and any security 
effort which ignores this fact can only result in a 
“fortress built upon sand.” 
It is an inherently insecure exercise to attempt to 
build an application requiring high levels of trust in 
the maintenance of security and privacy when the 
underlying structure within a computer system is a 
non-trusted operating system. Simply put, the trusted 
application relies totally upon the non-trusted 
operating system to access low level services. 
Our approach caters for the trusted operating 
system with the capacity to provide a viable and 
sustainable solution for the protection of sensitive 
health data in the healthcare environment. The 
authors define the characteristic features of OTHIS 
as: 
 OTHIS is an holistic approach to HIS 
consistent with health legal requirements,  
 OTHIS is an open architecture,  
 the OTHIS scheme builds on the top of 
trusted firmware and hardware bases, and 
 OTHIS is modularised architecture. 
3.1 Holistic Approach to HIS 
In achieving a high level of information assurance in 
HIS, we propose an holistic approach to a more 
trusted scheme, the Open and Trusted Health 
Information Systems (OTHIS). The goal of OTHIS is 
to address privacy and security requirements at each 
level within a modern HIS architecture to ensure the 
protection of data from both internal and external 
threats. OTHIS has the capacity to ensure legal 
compliance of any HIS to appropriate legislative and 
regulatory requirements. The primary emphasis in 
this paper is on the Australian health sector.  
3.2 Open Architecture 
OTHIS takes an open approach that can provide cost 
effective, viable and sustainable architecture to 
security and privacy in HIS. OTHIS embraces 
emerging open architecture, standard and solution 
technologies rather than use proprietary 
technologies. The inclusion of “open” in the OTHIS 
framework is to allow our proposed architecture to be 
available for public access and to provide a platform 
for interoperability. This approach is also supported 
by Goldstein Groen, Ponkshe and Wine (2007).  
Open systems allow disparate HIS to communicate 
and exchange clinical information in an open 
network environment. Normally HIS are based 
around open and distributed network systems; 
therefore, it is entirely appropriate to relate OTHIS to 
international standards such as Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) security architecture through 
standards ISO 7498-2 and ISO/IEO7498-4. This 
research adopts the broad architectural concepts as 
proposed in those standards and as adopted for some 
time by national governments via “Government OSI 
Profiles”. 
3.3 Trusted Platform 
OTHIS also involves the term “trust”, relating to 
“trusted system”. Any information system depends, 
fundamentally, upon a trusted base for safe and 
reliable operation, commonly referred to as a “trusted 
computing-base”. Without a trusted computing-base 
any system is subject to compromise. In particular, 
data security at the application level can be assured 
only when the healthcare application is operating on 
the top of the trusted computing-base platform. 
Otherwise the adversary can exploit illicit means to 
perform the actions that bypass or disable the security 
features of healthcare applications or that grant 
inappropriate access privileges. Inevitably healthcare 
applications or databases must be executed atop the 
trusted platform in order to achieve adequate 
information assurance. For this reason OTHIS aims 
at running on the top of trusted firmware and 
hardware bases. This trusted firmware and hardware 
base is commonly referred to as a Trusted Platform 
Module. This research assumes a commodity Trusted 
Platform Module upon which to deploy OTHIS. 
Many such modules are available in the marketplace. 
3.4 Modularised Architecture 
Appropriate data security management involves the 
protection of such data in storage, during processing 
and transmission. The proposed OTHIS structure 
(Figure 1) addresses all these areas and consists of 
three of distinct modules: 
 Health Informatics Access Control (HIAC),  
 Health Informatics Application Security 
(HIAS), and 
 Health Informatics Network Security 
(HINS). 
 
Figure 1: Open and Trusted Health Information 
Systems  
OTHIS is a modularised architecture for HIS. It 
can be clearly divided into separate and achievable 
function-based modules. The advantages of the 
modularisation include the fact that each module is 
easier to manage and maintain. One module can be 
changed without affecting the other module. OTHIS 
is, thus, a broad architecture covering those 
requirements and parts that may be selected as 
required to meet particular circumstances. There is 
some overlap with these three modules, however, 
each module has a specific focus area. HIAC is data 
centric dealing with information at rest, HIAS is 
process centric dealing with information under 
processing, and HINS is transfer centric dealing with 
information under transfer.  Trust in network 
operations through HINS rests completely upon trust 
in HIAS and HIAC; otherwise the security of 
messaging becomes futile. The focus of this paper is 
on the HIAC model. 
4 Health Informatics Access Control 
(HIAC) 
Access control mechanisms are used to define and 
then restrict users’ access to resources.  
Organisations would normally use these controls to 
grant employees, for example, the authority to access 
only the information those users need to perform 
their duties, i.e. the principle of “least privilege”.  
Access controls can limit the activities that an 
employee can perform on data at the level of 
granularity desired.  Access control mechanisms are 
therefore enabled at the operating system level as 
well as higher levels including data network 
management and the database management systems 
for the application. 
Access control is one of the fundamental security 
mechanisms used to protect computer resources, in 
particular in multi-user and resource-sharing 
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computer based environments such as those 
incorporated into a contemporary HIS.  The lack of 
adequate access control and associated system 
management in health relevant computer systems has 
been demonstrated on numerous occasions in recent 
history, including the privacy invasion situation at 
Australia's Centrelink (Sharanahan and Karvelas 
2006), the lack of adequate safeguards in the UK 
NHS patient records system (Leigh and Evans 2006), 
and the significant information technology security 
weaknesses identified in the US HHS information 
system (GAO 2006).  These types of information 
privacy violations or weaknesses have the potential 
for inflicting, and do inflict, major harm on HIS 
consumers and providers alike.  The issue of 
providing suitable computer operating system  access 
control in such systems is not an insurmountable one.  
Indeed, appropriate computer-based access control 
schemes do exist and can be deployed to address 
these information security issues. 
4.1 Access Control Models 
Discretionary access control essentially assigns 
responsibility for all security parameters to the 
“owners” (users) of such larger entities, usually their 
creator, who could pass on such parameters to others 
and perform functions as desired. Role-based Access 
Control refines the concept to allow users to be 
grouped into defined functions or “roles” allowing 
for far easier management of overall system security 
policy particularly in dynamic business 
environments. Mandatory access control (MAC), in 
principle, enforces security policy as set out by the 
overall enterprise and not set up by definitions 
provided by file/program “owners”.  The traditional 
MAC policy was originally designed for a military 
environment based on the multi-level security policy 
hierarchical structure and was quite rigid in its 
application. More recent research has modernised the 
traditional MAC approach to a flexible form of MAC 
(Flexible MAC) that overcomes traditional MAC 
limitations with the enforcement of a wider range of 
security requirements including confidentiality, 
integrity, least privilege and separation of duty. 
4.2 HIAC is Flexible MAC-based 
Architecture 
HIAC is a Flexible MAC-based model accompanied 
by Role-based Access Control properties to simplify 
authorisation management. This degree of 
simultaneous control, flexibility and a refined level 
of granularity is not achievable with Discretionary 
Access Control, Role-based Access Control or MAC 
individually. HIAC proposes a viable solution to 
providing appropriate levels of secure access control 
for the protection of sensitive health data. 
Increasingly, HIS are being developed and deployed 
based upon commercial, commodity-level 
information and communications technology 
products and systems. Such general-purpose systems 
have been created over the last 25 years with often 
only minimal security functionality and verification. 
In particular access control, a vital security function 
in any operating system that forms the basis for 
application packages, has been founded upon earlier 
designs based on Discretionary Access Control. 
Discretionary Access Control systems were defined 
around an environment where data and program 
resources were developed and deployed within a 
single enterprise, assuming implicit trust amongst 
users. This environmental model is no longer valid 
for modern HIS. In some commercial systems, for 
example, even the addition of a simple single printer 
unit has the capacity to seriously undermine the 
overall integrity of the information system. 
4.3 HIAC Platform 
Currently available products that support the MAC 
principles of operating systems include: 
 “Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) Version 
5 and “Fedora Core 9”,  
 “Sun Microsystems Solaris 10 with Trusted 
Extensions Software”,  
 “Novell SUSE Linux Application Armor 
(AppArmor)”, and  
 “FreeBSD 5.0”. 
The HIAC model exploits the 
security-enhancement features of such trusted 
operating system in the healthcare environment. The 
end result is a dedicated trusted HIS which satisfies 
all security requirements. To determine the practical 
viability of a HIAC model for HIS a demonstrator 
was built on the Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux) 
operating system by Henricksen, Caelli and Croll. 
(2007) with RHEL Version 4. This was later 
modernized by Franco Martin (2008) with Fedora 
Core 9. 
4.4 Flask Architecture – Flexible MAC – 
SELinux 
The U.S. National Security Agency designed and 
engineered SELinux with a security architecture 
named the Flux Advanced Security Kernel (Flask). It 
aims to set an example of how Flexible MAC could 
be added to a mainstream operating system to greatly 
improve the security of the system. Flexible MAC 
provides a balance of security needs and flexibility of 
implementation that allows the security policy to be 
modified, customised and extended as required in 
line with normal application and system 
requirements. SELinux also provides separation of 
security domains as a fail-safe feature to enable the 
confinement of damage caused by the probability of 
malicious or flawed code execution (Loscocco and 
Smalley 2001). The flexibility of SELinux includes 
the separation of the security policy logic from the 
enforcement mechanism. This enables the 
independent policy module to be modified and 
extended as required without affecting the rest of the 
kernel or the need to restart the system. 
4.5 Protection and Enforcement Using 
SELinux Policy and Profile in HIAC 
In general, the organisational security policies are 
defined by CEO/CIO. Access privileges are 
determined by the data custodians. The system 
administrator configures and deploys the 
organisational access policy defined and determined 
by the CEO/CIO and the data custodian. The 
following sections describe the procedures of 
developing a security policy and using SELinux 
security mechanisms to protect sensitive health 
information for HIS. 
To use SELinux Policy to implement the 
organisational access policy, one must understand 
the SELinux Policy mechanisms. SELinux Policy is a 
collection of rules that determine allowed access for a 
system created in accordance with the corporate 
security policy. An SELinux Policy consists of a set 
of SELinux Profiles (policy modules) that define the 
associated security properties controlling the security 
behaviour of the system. The following procedure 
steps show the development of an SELinux policy 
(Figure 2): 
 
Figure 2: SELinux Profile Development Cycle 
 
1. Create policy module(s), such as for 
physicians, medical researchers, nurses and 
patients policy modules. 
2. Compile the policy module(s) to generate the 
binary policy file(s) as a loadable kernel 
module(s). 
3. Load the binary policy file(s) into the 
running kernel for access enforcement. 
4. If policy module(s) require(s) changes, the 
modified policy module(s) is (are) 
recompiled and then reloaded into the 
running kernel.  
4.6 SELinux Concepts – User Identifier, 
Role and Type Identifier 
The SELinux Policy is now configured and loaded 
into the kernel ready for operation. Figure 3 shows 
the authorisation process flow in SELinux. 
Figure 3: Authorisation Process Flow in SELinux 
After a user is authenticated to the SELinux 
system, the user logs into the system with his/her 
username which is associated with a Linux unique 
user identifier (UID). A Linux UID is generated 
when a user account is created (Table 1). A user may 
have more than one user account. In SELinux, the 
system administrator maps the Linux UID(s) of the 
user to an SELinux UID, so that any action 
performed within the system by the same user can be 
traced for accountability.  In addition, having 
different user identifiers helps to keep Linux 
Discretionary Access Control mechanisms separated 
from the SELinux MAC mechanisms. 
The user access privileges, which are user, role, 
domains and types associated with SELinux UID, are 
defined in the SELinux Policy. The system verifies 
the SELinux Policy to retrieve access privileges 
which define the SELinux Profile of the user. The 
authorised access can now begin from this point. 
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Physician 
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hc_doc_u hc_doc_r hc_doc_diag_t 
Medical  
Researcher 
resjohn 
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hc_res_u hc_res_r hc_res_diag_t 
Nurse 
nuralice  
(503) 
hc_nur_u hc_nur_r hc_nur_diag_t 
Patient 
patluis  
(504) 
hc_pat_u hc_pat_r hc_pat_diag_t 
Table 1: Linux UID, SELinux UID, Role and Type 
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Patient profile
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ation
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Verify 
SELinux 
policy
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SELinux 
profile for 
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Start 
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session
4.7 SELinux Security Mechanisms to 
Protect Sensitive Health Data  
In SELinux, type enforcement is the primary access 
control feature where access control is based on a 
security context. All subjects and objects have a type 
identifier associated with them. To access an object, 
the subject’s type must be authorised for the object’s 
type. Namely, TE makes access decisions based on 
the security context to determine access. A security 
context consists of three elements: user, role and type 
identifier. 
With SELinux, users are assigned a set of roles 
which determine a set of processes authorised for the 
user's identity. Domains are used to specify how roles 
can interact with subjects and objects in the system. 
Different sets of domains are authorised for each of 
the user roles based on the TE rules defined in the 
SELinux policy. 
SELinux allows dividing the system space into a 
set of “sandboxes” determined by the authorised user 
domains.  An application running on behalf of a user 
is allowed to access certain resources in the system. 
To prevent unauthorised access, a medical related 
sandbox can be used to isolate a space in which a 
medical application is permitted to access medical 
records. The following clinical scenario is used to 
explain this concept. 
It is assumed that a doctor “Paul” is associated 
with a physician role, which is allowed to run the 
Diagnostic Application within a specified domain 
“hc_doc_diag_t” and is allowed to access the files 
with type “hc_diag_file_t”. In fact, when Paul 
activates the Diagnostic Application, the system 
process labelled with the domain “hc_doc_diag_t”, is 
acting on behalf of Paul. It enters the domain 
“hc_diag_doc_t” with specified access permissions 
to the those objects and subject types associated with 
this domain only. Assume that user “John” is 
associated with a medical researcher role. Even if 
John is allowed to access the Diagnostic Application, 
John is accessing this application through the domain 
“hc_res_diag_t”. This domain is authorised to access 
different resources than the physician. Therefore, 
even if they use the same application, in the same 
system, they cannot access the same resources. 
SELinux Sandboxes can be constructed to protect 
medical data from a compromised application 
(Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4: Protect Sensitive Health Data with 
SELinux  
Medical researchers are authorised to access the 
medical information for secondary usage within 
another sandbox. If a “backdoor” is open for a hacker 
to gain access privileges over unauthorised 
resources, the hacker only has access to the medical 
information for secondary usage within that sandbox. 
The damage from this compromised application 
therefore can be contained within a single domain, 
not the entire system. In contrast, in a Discretionary 
Access Control based system, the damage from 
compromised applications cannot be restricted within 
a space. In particular, if the hacker gains the access 
privileges of a system administrator, the entire 
system is compromised including the sensitive 
individual health information. 
4.8 Example of an SELinux Policy Module 
This section provides an example of coding for 
SELinux Profile in relation to how a physician and a 
medical researcher can run the Diagnostic 
Application with different accesses to different types 
of health data files. The two users can be defined in 
SELinux: “hc_doc_u” and “hc_res_u”. The code 
specifies the sandboxes to be accessed when the 
authorised physicians and medical researchers run 
the Diagnostic Application, that is “hc_doc_diag_t” 
for the authorised physicians and “hc_res_diag_t” for 
the authorised medical researchers. The domain 
“hc_res_diag_t” is defined to allowed access to the 
data files with type “hc_res_dbfile_t” (i.e. data files 
for the authorised researchers accesses). The domain 
“hc_doc_diag_t” is specified to access the data files 
with type “hc_pnt_dbfile_t” (i.e. sensitive health data 
files). In such a way, the medical researcher is not 
able to access sensitive data files with the 
unauthorised role. That is, the medical researcher can 
access only the domain “hc_diag_res_t” and data 
files associated with type “hc_res_dbfile_t”. 
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# Type for the Diagnostic Application executable file  
type hc_diag_sys_exec_t; 
files_type(hc_diag_sys_exec_t) 
 
# Type for the DB files which can be accessed by researchers. 
Type hc_res_dbfile_t; 
files_type(hc_res_dbfile_t) 
 
# Type for the DB files which can be accessed by physicians. 
# This type can be assigned to files containing sensitive information. 
Type hc_pnt_dbfile_di_t; 
files_type(hc_pnt_dbfile_di_t) 
 
# This interface creates types, roles and domains to be assigned to physicians. 
Healthcare_create_users(hc_doc) 
# This interface creates types, roles and domains to be assigned to  
#  researchers. 
Healthcare_create_users(hc_res) 
 
# These interfaces assign only the necessary privileges for the user to access 
# their home directory. 
 
# This interface authorises physicians to access the delegated sandbox while  
# executing the Diagnostic Application. 
Diag_general_domain(hc_doc) 
 
# This authorises researchers to access the delegated sandbox during  
# executing the Diagnostic Application. 
Diag_general_domain(hc_res) 
 
# The “diag_general_domain” is described in more detail further in this document. 
# These references to this interface create two domains which constitute the  
# sandboxes for physicians and researchers: hc_doc_diag_t and hc_res_diag_t. 
 
# This line of code authorises physicians to create, write and read DB files 
# with the type hc_pnt_dbfile_di_t while operating within the boundaries of the 
# sandbox. The boundary of the sandbox is defined with the domain 
# hc_doc_diag_t. 
allow hc_doc_diag_t hc_pnt_dbfile_di_t:file { create_file_perms \ 
                                     write_file_perms read_file_perms }; 
 
# This line of code authorises researchers to create DB files with the type 
# hc_res_dbfile_di_t while operating within the boundary of the delegated 
#sandbox. 
# The boundaries of the sandbox are defined with the domain hc_res_diag_t. 
allow hc_res_diag_t hc_res_dbfile_di_t:file { read_file_perms }; 
 
# The following 2 statements authorise the roles corresponding to physicians  
# and researchers to access their corresponding domains. 
role hc_doc_r types { hc_doc_diag_t }; 
role hc_res_r types { hc_res_diag_t }; 
An SELinux Policy is comprised of different 
components. These components can be placed in 
three different files: type enforcement, context file 
and interface files. In the above code, researchers and 
physicians are authorised to access their delegated 
specific sandboxes while running the Diagnostic 
Application. These privileges are granted through the 
use of the “diag_general_domain” interface which is 
shown below. 
interface('diag_general_domain',` 
   type $1_diag_t; 
   domain_type($1_diag_t) 
 
   domain_auto_trans($1_t, hc_diag_sys_exec_t, $1_diag_t) 
   domain_entry_file($1_diag_t, hc_diag_sys_exec_t)  
 
   allow $1_diag_t $1_t:process sigchld; 
   allow $1_diag_t $1_tty_device_t:chr_file { rw_term_perms append }; 
   allow $1_diag_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_term_perms append }; 
} 
 
5 Analysis 
To meet real-world application security demands that 
are understandable, implementable and usable, our 
OTHIS research embraces reasonable security 
strategies against economic realities using open 
solution technologies such as SELinux rather than 
using proprietary technologies. In general, open 
source technologies are free to use, modify, and 
redistribute. Developers of open source software 
distribute their software freely and make profits from 
support contracts and customised development. It is 
an expensive exercise to use proprietary software in 
particular for large enterprises to upgrade software 
and increase its number of software licenses. The 
costs of using proprietary software involve the 
procurement of a software license and software 
upgrades. Open source technologies have gained 
significant attention in the marketplace. A Gartner 
report
3
predicts that more than 90 percent of 
enterprises will use open source in direct embedded 
ways by 2012. In particular, open source software is 
essential for large enterprises who seek to reduce 
their total cost of ownership and increase returns on 
investment.  A common complaint related to open 
source is the lack of a reliable source of assistance 
when organisations encounter problems in open 
source software. One can resolve this through the 
subscription of service support from the open source 
developer. 
It is essential to integrate security profiling 
structures in relation to other enterprise systems such 
as overall human resource management systems and 
the like. This allows for definition and deployment of 
security policies that represent legal, regulatory, 
policy and enterprise level requirements for reliable 
and consistent enforcement at the computer system 
level. The primary and well-known strengthen of 
SELinux is security, yet the level of complexity in 
policy configuration could be considered beyond the 
expertise level of many CIOs in health related 
organisations. Simplifying the level of complexity in 
SELinux configuration can be managed through the 
current distribution containing the SELinux 
Reference Policy. This is an example of a general 
purpose security policy configuration which can 
meet a number of security objectives and can be used 
as the basis for creating other policies. Additionally, 
there is a number of SELinux Policy generation and 
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 A ZDNet new article “A Gartner: Open source will 
quietly take over” is available at 
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/software/0,1000000121,3937990
0,00.htm accessed 29/08/2008.  
management tools
4
 available to simplify the 
development of SELinux Policy. 
Currently, the Flask architecture with the Flexible 
MAC enforcement is a rapidly growing area gaining 
global attention since its introduction in SELinux. A 
recent press release
5
 issued in 2008 announced that 
Flask will also be implemented in Sun Microsystems 
OpenSolar operating system to advance MAC. Thus, 
tools and techniques are constantly developed from 
the open source community to address the complex 
configuration challenges of SELinux. In fact, our 
HIAC demonstrator for HIS was built on RHEL 
version 4”, which was carried out at the primitive 
stage of SELinux project development (Henricksen, 
Caelli and Croll 2007). It was argued that the 
previous SELinux policy facilities were too 
inflexible to handle a large scale of HIS which may 
involve dynamic and frequent changes to the security 
policies such as adding/deleting users and 
applications. With the earlier SELinux distribution, 
any changes and extensions made to the SELinux 
Policy would have needed the policy to be 
recompiled and the system to be restarted. As 
SELinux continues to advance and evolve, any 
changes to the security policies can be recompiled 
with available tools and techniques and then updated 
security polices reloaded into the system kernel 
without the need to restart the system. To date our 
HIAC demonstrator has been updated with Fedora 
Core 9 to confirm the flexibility of the current release 
of SELinux. 
6 Conclusion and Future Work 
Current trends are towards using Web Services as the 
technology to develop and implement healthcare 
application systems. Their focus is on security 
aspects in exchanging clinical information 
electronically at the application level. This is 
endorsed by NEHTA (2005). The moves towards 
Service Oriented Architecture/Web Services global 
systems present major challenges where such 
structures are not based on highly trusted operating 
systems. All applications and supporting software 
which necessarily reside atop the untrusted operating 
systems are also considered untrusted. Health 
information is highly sensitive by its nature. It is 
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 Links to SELinux Policy generation tools are available at 
http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/SELinux/PolicyGenTools 
accessed 27/08/2008.  
5
 A media release has been issue announcing the joint 
venture between the NSA and Sun Microsystems to 
advance MAC named “National Security Agency And Sun 
Microsystems Lead OpenSolaris Community Project To 
Advance Mandatory Access Controls” is available at 
http://www.sun.com/aboutsun/pr/2008-03/sunflash.20080
313.1.xml accessed 27/08/2008. 
therefore critical to protect such information from 
security hazards and privacy threats. 
The authors argue that using the non-MAC-based 
system to protect personal privacy and 
confidentiality of electronic health records is not 
sustainable. This is evidenced by a number of 
scenarios related to health information privacy 
violations or weaknesses which have recently been 
found in Australia, the UK and the USA (Liu, Caelli, 
May and Croll 2007). Our OTHIS/HIAC research 
argues that the need of a radical re-think is absolutely 
crucial in the understanding of access control in light 
of modern information system structures, legislative 
and regulatory requirements and security operational 
demands in HIS. This is affirmed by the Australian 
Government
6
 calls for robust legislation to protect 
individual electronic health record systems. This 
security focus enhances the quality of healthcare 
service delivery with respect to privacy assurance 
and is a key element of the overall success of such a 
system. 
Information and communications technologies are 
now sufficiently advanced that a MAC-based 
electronic healthcare management system is feasible. 
Our approach overcomes many of the security issues 
which have plagued previous attempts at electronic 
health management systems. The authors argue that 
adoption of appropriate security technologies, 
including in particular Flexible MAC-oriented 
operating system bases, can satisfy the requirements 
for the protection of sensitive health data. 
Preliminary results of this research indicate that 
the broad philosophy of Flexible MAC appears 
ideally suited to the protection of the healthcare 
information systems environment.  This study, 
therefore, contends that the approach to “hardening” 
electronic HIS is essential to build privacy- and 
security-aware applications that reside atop Flexible 
MAC-based operating systems. Such systems have 
the potential to meet all stakeholder requirements 
including modern information structures, 
organisational security policies, legislative and 
regulatory requirements for both healthcare 
providers’ and healthcare consumers’ expectations 
and demands in HIS. 
To provide sustainable and trusted health 
information systems, one must take an holistic 
approach to address security requirements at all 
levels in HIS. The overall HIS architecture must 
evolve into a set of complementary security 
architectures which, at least, incorporates those 
                                                     
6
 A press release has been issued entitled “E-health 
privacy blueprint - robust legislation is needed says 
Privacy Commissioner” is available at 
http://www.privacy.gov.au/news/media/2008_15.html 
accessed 27/08/2008  
proposed under the OTHIS scheme consisting of 
HIAC, HIAS and HINS. This paper focuses on 
OTHIS/HIAC which proposes a viable solution to 
provide appropriate levels of secure access control 
for the protection of sensitive health data. Future 
research under OTHIS will continue to develop and 
test through experimental structures created on a 
Flexible MAC-based operating system. Key research 
questions to be answered include those issues of data 
“at rest” and “under processing” aspects of the 
proposed architecture OTHIS. This research will also 
elucidate the relationships between HIAS which 
relies completely upon trust in HIAC and HINS.     
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